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In this paper we study the implications of general-purpose technological growth for asset prices. The
model features two types of shocks: "small", frequent, and disembodied shocks to productivity and
"large" technological innovations, which are embodied into new vintages of the capital stock. While
the former affect the economy on impact, the latter affect the economy with lags, since firms need
to first adopt the new technologies through investment. The process of adoption leads to cycles in
asset valuations and risk premia as firms convert the growth options associated with the new technologies
into assets in place. This process can help provide a unified, investment-based view of some well documented
phenomena such as the asset-valuation patterns around major technological innovations, the countercyclical
behavior of returns, the lead-lag relationship between the stock market and output, and the increasing
patterns of consumption-return correlations over longer horizons.
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Economic historians frequently associate waves of economic activity with the arrival of ma-
jor technological innovations. The profound changes to manufacturing during the industrial
revolution, the expanding network of railroads in the late nineteenth century, electriﬁcation,
telephony, television, and the internet during the course of the last century are only a small
number of well-known examples of a general pattern whereby a new technology arrives, gets
slowly adopted and eventually permeates and alters all aspects of production and distribu-
tion. Naturally, these technological waves impact numerous markets, and especially asset
markets, which reﬂect anticipations of future growth and facilitate the ﬂow of capital towards
innovative activity. The impact of technological waves on asset prices is the focus of this
paper.
We build a tractable general-equilibrium model within which we characterize the behavior
of asset prices throughout the technology-adoption cycle. We argue that the anticipatory
nature of asset prices together with the slow deployment of technological innovations generate
the joint properties of returns, output, and consumption documented in the data. We believe
that the new mechanisms highlighted by our model can complement and improve on the
explanatory power of existing endowment-based theories of return time variation.
Our main point of departure from previous work on asset pricing is that we explicitly
allow for the joint presence of two types of technological shocks. The ﬁrst type of shocks
are the usual productivity shocks that are routinely assumed in the production-based asset-
pricing literature. These shocks are technology “neutral” or “disembodied”, in the sense that
they aﬀect the productivity of the entire capital stock irrespective of its vintage. However,
this type of shocks do not fundamentally alter the technology used to produce consumption
goods. The second type of shocks correspond to (infrequent) arrivals of major technological
or organizational innovations, like automobiles, the internet, etc. These shocks do not aﬀect
the economy on impact, but only after ﬁrms have invested in new vintages of the capital
stock that “embody” the technological improvements.
The investment in new capital vintages is assumed to involve a ﬁxed (labor) cost that
1is irreversible. Firms choose the optimal time to invest in the new capital vintages, which
leads to an endogenous lag between the arrival of embodied technological shocks and their
eventual eﬀects on output and consumption. This process of technological adoption generates
endogenous persistence and investment-driven cycles, even though all shocks in the model
arrive in an unpredictable i.i.d. fashion.
The link between the macroeconomy and asset pricing in our model revolves around the
idea that growth options of ﬁrms exhibit a “life cycle” as technologies diﬀuse. On impact
of a major technological shock, growth options emerge in the prices of all securities. These
growth options are riskier than assets in place, and hence tend to increase the volatility of
equity prices and the risk premia in the economy. In the initial phases of the technological
cycle (i.e., when consumption is below its stochastic trend line) expected returns in the stock
market are therefore high, simply because most growth options have not yet been exercised.
As time passes, ﬁrms start converting growth options into assets in place, hence reducing
the risk premium on their stock.
We argue that this investment-driven time variation in expected returns provides a nat-
ural mechanism to explain slow and countercyclical movements in expected returns (high
expected returns when consumption is below its stochastic trend and vice versa). More im-
portantly, the current model provides a uniﬁed theory for some additional patterns of the
joint time-series evolution of returns and consumption in the data that can be challenging for
some leading endowment-based models.1 Speciﬁcally, the model can account for a) the fact
that returns lead rather than lag output and consumption and b) the robust pattern that
correlations between consumption and returns are weak at short horizons (over a quarter)
and become stronger over longer horizons (over 1-3 years). In the model, these additional
patterns emerge naturally, since major technological innovations produce consumption gains
with a lag, but aﬀect asset valuations immediately. This delayed reaction of consumption
1See Yu (2007) for a discussion of the diﬃculties of existing endowment-based models to account for some
of these facts. See also Backus et al. (2008) for further evidence on the lead-lag relationship between excess
returns and macroeconomic aggregates.
2helps explain empirical observations a) and b) above. Finally, the tractability of the model
allows a joint discussion of the time-series and cross-sectional patterns of returns. We show
that the model is consistent with both aggregate time-series and cross-sectional patterns
(such as the size and the value premium) of returns in general equilibrium.2
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. The paper by Carlson et al.
(2004) is the most closely related to ours. Carlson et al. (2004) develop the intuition that the
exercise of growth options can lead to variation in expected returns in a partial-equilibrium
setting. In our paper, a similar mechanism operates in general equilibrium. By making con-
sumption and returns jointly endogenous we are able to discuss a richer set of implications
for asset pricing, such as short- and long-run correlations between consumption and returns,
lead-lag relationships, aggregate time-series implications for consumption, investment, and
returns, etc. Gomes et al. (2003) also analyze a general-equilibrium production-based model
and examine the time series and cross sectional properties of returns, as we do. The two
most signiﬁcant diﬀerences between their set-up and ours are a) the distinction between
embodied and disembodied aggregate technological shocks,3 and b) the presence of an opti-
mal timing decision concerning the exercise of growth options.4 Since all shocks in Gomes
et al. (2003) are disembodied productivity shocks, they aﬀect the economy on impact and
afterwards their eﬀects dissipate. Our model diﬀerentiates between technological shocks
that aﬀect the economy on impact (disembodied shocks) and shocks that aﬀect the econ-
2See Santos and Veronesi (2008) for a discussion of the tensions faced by leading endowment-based general
equilibrium models in matching simultaneously time-series and cross-sectionalaspects of return predictability.
3More generally, the literature on production-based asset-pricing routinely abstracts from this distinction.
For contributions to this literature, see Cochrane (1996), Jermann (1998), Berk et al. (1999), Berk et al.
(2004), Kogan (2004), Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006), Gomes et al. (2003), Carlson et al. (2004),
Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006), Gourio (2004), Zhang (2005), and Gala (2006) among others. Papanikolaou
(2007) draws a distinction between productivity shocks and investment speciﬁc shocks, but does not discuss
embodied shocks or diﬀerent capital vintages.
4Gomes et al. (2003) follow the seminal paper by Berk et al. (1999) and assume that options arrive in an
i.i.d. fashion across ﬁrms and have a “take it or leave it” nature. By contrast, in our model all ﬁrms have
discretion over the timing of their investment.
3omy with a lag (embodied shocks). The result is a distinctive set of implications for the
joint time-series properties of returns and macroeconomic aggregates (lead-lag relationships,
correlation patterns, etc.) and the mechanism that produces return countercyclicality. A
further implication is that in Gomes et al. (2003) cycles are driven by a trend-stationary
productivity process, which implies a trend-stationary consumption process. In our model,
all exogenous shocks follow random walks, while cycles emerge endogenously as the result of
the economy’s adoption of new technological vintages. As a result, consumption preserves a
strong random-walk component, which is a salient feature of consumption in the data.
The theoretical literature on expected-return time variation is also related to this paper.
We do not attempt to summarize this literature here; instead we refer to Cochrane (2005)
for an overview. A leading approach to explaining the time variation and predictability of
(expected) returns is to assume countercyclical risk aversion at the level of the “representa-
tive” consumer. As Yu (2007) shows, the strengthening of consumption-return correlations
with the horizon,5 as well as the fact that stock-market returns tend to lead consumption
and output growth, present challenges for single-shock, pure-endowment economies with
countercyclical risk aversion. Our approach shows how the interplay of multiple shocks in
an investment-based framework can address these issues. An alternative approach in the
literature, pioneered by Bansal and Yaron (2004), considers endowment economies with pre-
dictable consumption growth and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences. As Yu (2007) and Backus
et al. (2008) show, this type of models can capture the lead-lag relationships between con-
sumption and returns, assuming that consumption volatility is stochastic and appropriately
anticipates consumption growth. The present investment-driven approach provides an alter-
native to explaining these facts with i.i.d. shocks, thus circumventing the need to perform
the potentially diﬃcult task of estimating stochastic volatility in consumption and the extent
to which it anticipates consumption growth.
Motivated by the events of the late nineties, Pastor and Veronesi (2009) connect the
arrival of technological growth with the “bubble”-type behavior of asset prices around these
5See also Daniel and Marshall (1999) on this issue.
4events.6 Our model produces similar patterns. However, the focus of the two papers and the
mechanisms are diﬀerent. Our mechanism uses the endogenous exercise of growth options
to produce variations in expected returns. Moreover, by considering recurrent arrivals of
technological innovations we can discuss implications of the model for the joint stationary
distributions of excess returns and macroeconomic aggregates and link technological growth
with well documented time-series and cross-sectional patterns of returns.
There is a large literature in macroeconomics and economic growth that analyzes in-
novation, dissemination of new technologies, and the impact of the arrival of new capital
vintages.7 In contrast to our paper, this literature concentrates on innovation decisions in a
deterministic environment, rather than the pricing of risk in a stochastic environment.
A technical contribution of our work is that it provides a tractable solution to a general-
equilibrium model in which the micro-decisions are “lumpy” and exhibit optimal-stopping
features.8 In recent work, aspects of this model have been used by Obreja and Telmer
(2008) to study long run variations’s in Tobin’s q and by Iraola and Santos (2009) to study
links between news about innovations, the macroeconomy, and asset prices. Hsu (2009)
studies empirically the link between the arrival of technological innovations and aggregate
risk premia.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model and Section 3
the resulting equilibrium allocations. Section 4 presents the qualitative and quantitative
implications of the model. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
6Other papers that have analyzed the recent upswing in prices include Pastor and Veronesi (2004) and
Jermann and Quadrini (2007).
7A small sample of papers includes Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003),
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), and Helpman (1998).
8The micro decision of the ﬁrm has a similar structure to the partial-equilibrium model of Abel and
Eberly (2005). Just as ﬁrms in that paper adapt to the technological frontier at an optimally chosen time,
ﬁrms in our framework decide on the optimal time to plant new trees. Moreover, by assuming cross sectional
heterogeneity only at the beginning of an epoch, we can aggregate over ﬁrms in a much simpler way than the
existing literature. For other analytically tractable approaches to aggregation see also Gomes et al. (2003),
Caballero and Pindyck (1996), and Novy-Marx (2003).
52 Model
2.1 Trees, ﬁrms, and technological epochs
There exists a continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j ∈ [0,1], which produce consumption goods.
Each ﬁrm owns a collection of trees that have been planted in diﬀerent technological epochs,
and its total earnings are simply the sum of the earnings produced by the trees it owns.
In turn, each tree produces earnings that are the product of three components: a) a time-
invariant tree-speciﬁc component, b) a time-varying aggregate-productivity component, and
c) a vintage-speciﬁc component, which is common across all trees of the same technological
epoch. To introduce notation, let YN,i,t denote the earnings stream of tree i at time t that
was planted in the technological epoch N ∈ (−∞,+∞). In particular, assume the functional
form
YN,i,t = ζ(i)θtAN. (1)
The ﬁrst term, ζ(i), is a positive, strictly decreasing function, mapping the interval [0,1]
to R+. ζ(i) is time invariant and captures a tree-speciﬁc eﬀect. The second term, θt, is the
common productivity shock and evolves as a geometric Brownian Motion:
dθt
θt
= µdt + σdBt, (2)
where µ > 0 and σ > 0 are constants and Bt is a standard Brownian Motion. The term AN
captures a vintage-speciﬁc eﬀect, which is common to all trees that are planted in epoch N.
We make two assumptions about the evolution of AN. First, AN+1 ≥ AN, so that vintages
of trees planted in epoch N +1 are more productive than their predecessors (all else equal).
Second, the ratio AN+1/AN is increasing in the extent of technological adoption that took
place in epoch N. Speciﬁcally, letting KN,t ∈ [0,1] denote the mass of trees that were planted










6Equation (3) reﬂects a standard assumption in the endogenous growth theory that is
sometimes referred to as “standing on the shoulders of giants”. The act of planting new
trees produces knowledge and stimulates further innovation in future epochs.9 Accordingly,
the rate of increase between AN+1 and AN depends on the investment activity in period N.10
Technological epochs arrive exogenously at the Poisson rate λ > 0. Throughout, we denote
the arrival time of epoch N as τN. Once a new epoch arrives, the index N becomes N + 1,
and every ﬁrm gains the option to plant a single tree of the new vintage at a time of its
choosing.
Firm heterogeneity is introduced as follows: Once epoch N arrives, each ﬁrm j draws a
random number ij,N from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. This number informs the ﬁrm
of the type of tree that it can plant in the new epoch N. In particular a ﬁrm that drew
the number ij,N can plant a tree with tree-speciﬁc productivity ζ(ij,N). These numbers are
drawn in an i.i.d. fashion across epochs. To simplify the setup, we assume that once an
epoch changes, the ﬁrm loses the option to plant a tree that corresponds to any previous11
9For some background on the “standing on the shoulders of giants” assumption, see e.g. the seminal paper
of Romer (1990) who assumes that the arrival rate of new blueprints depends on the level of past blueprints.
For a textbook treatment, see Jones (1997). Scotchmer (1991) contains a number of concrete examples of the
positive eﬀects of past innovation on new innovation ranging from the cotton gin to techniques of inserting
genes into bacteria.
10From an asset pricing perspective, an advantage of the speciﬁcation (3) is that it mitigates the pre-
dictability of consumption growth. For example, in a previous version of the model where the ratio of
AN+1/AN is equal to a constant, the consumption cycles that are implied by the model are more persistent
than under speciﬁcation (3). Since consumption growth is not very predictable in the data, the speciﬁcation
(3) is advantageous.
11The assumption that a ﬁrm can plant a tree corresponding only to the current epoch can be re-







, where ¯ A ≥
ζ(0)
ζ(1). Under this alternative assumption, for any ﬁrm j and any
epoch N, we obtain AN+1ζ(ij,N+1) ≥ AN+1ζ(1) ≥ AN ¯ Aζ(1) ≥ ANζ(0) ≥ ANζ(ij,N). Assuming that it
costs the same to plant a tree of vintage N +1 or of vintage n ∈ (−∞,N], ﬁrm j would never ﬁnd it optimal
to plant a tree of a previous vintage. However, this model modiﬁcation adds complexity without any extra
insights, and we avoid it for parsimony.




Anζ(ij,n)1{  χn,j=1}, (4)
where N denotes the technological epoch at time t and 1{  χn,j=1} is an indicator function
equal to 1 if ﬁrm j decided to plant a tree in technological epoch n and 0 otherwise. A ﬁrm’s
total earnings are then given by Yj,t = Xj,tθt.
Any given ﬁrm determines the time at which it plants a tree in an optimal manner.
Planting a tree at time t requires a ﬁxed cost of qt. This cost represents payments that
need to be given to workers who will plant these trees and will be determined in general
equilibrium. To keep with the usual assumptions of a Lucas tree economy, we assume that
the company ﬁnances these ﬁxed payments by issuing new equity.12
Assuming complete markets, the ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize shareholder value. Since
the productivity index ij,N is i.i.d. across epochs, there is no linkage between the decision
to plant a tree in this epoch and any future epochs. Thus, the option to plant a tree can be
studied in isolation in each epoch.
The optimization problem of ﬁrm j in epoch N amounts to choosing the stopping time






















where Hs is the (endogenously determined) stochastic discount factor, τN+1 is the random
time at which the next epoch arrives, and P o
N,j,t denotes the value of the (real) option of
planting a new tree in epoch N.
Given the setup, a ﬁrm’s price consists of three components: a) the value of assets in
place, b) the value of the growth option in the current technological epoch, and c) the value













12This assumption is inessential, since the completeness of markets (which we assume shortly) ensures that
the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds.














the value of all future growth options, the price of ﬁrm j, assuming it has not planted a tree








Naturally, for a ﬁrm that has planted a tree in the current technological epoch there is no










Since the ﬁrms described in Section 2.1 produce consumption goods, the total consumption










with Xj,t deﬁned in (4). Before proceeding, it is useful to deﬁne F(x) ≡
  x
0 ζ(i)di. Since ζ( )
is positive and declining, we obtain Fx ≥ 0, Fxx < 0, so that F(x) has two key properties of
a production function, namely it is increasing and concave. Assuming that ﬁrms with more
productive trees always plant their trees before ﬁrms with less productive trees (we show
later that this is indeed the case), and using the dynamics of AN (equation (3)) and the
deﬁnition of KN,t gives13
Ct = ANθt [1 + F (KN,t)]. (10)






















n≤N−1 (An+1 − An) = AN (1 − limn→−∞ (An/AN)) converges to AN (assuming a strictly posi-
tive probability that
  Kn,t
0 ζ(i)di > 0 for all n). Hence
  1







9Aggregate output of consumption goods is thus the product of two terms: (a) the non-
stationary stochastic trend ANθt, which captures the joint eﬀects of technological progress
due to the arrival of epochs (AN) and neutral aggregate productivity growth (θt), and (b)
the component [1 + F(KN,t)], which captures the contribution of technological adoption in
the current epoch and is a stationary, cyclical component, as we show in the next section.
2.3 Markets





In additional to shares in all ﬁrms, zero-net-supply zero-coupon bonds of arbitrary ma-
turities are available for trade. We assume that markets are complete.14 Accordingly, the
search for equilibrium prices can be reduced to the search for a stochastic discount factor Ht,
which will coincide with the marginal utility of consumption for the representative agent.
(See Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Chapter 4.)
2.4 Consumer-workers and preferences
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumers-workers that can be ag-
gregated into a single re presentative agent. The representative agent owns all the ﬁrms in
the economy, and is also the (competitive) provider of labor services.
We shall use a preference speciﬁcation introduced by Abel (1990), which generalizes
standard constant relative risk aversion to allow for some degree of external habit forma-
tion. Speciﬁcally, letting ct denote the representative agent’s consumption, Ct the aggregate
14In particular, market completeness requires the existence of markets where agents can trade securities
(in zero net supply) that promise to pay 1 unit of the numeraire when technological round N arrives. These
markets are redundant in general equilibrium, since agents are able to create dynamic portfolios of stocks
and bonds that produce the same payoﬀ as these claims. However, it is easiest to assume their existence in
order to guarantee ex-ante that markets are complete.
10consumption, and MC
t = maxs≤t {Cs} the running maximum of aggregate consumption, the



















,where α ∈ [0,1]. (12)
This utility speciﬁcation nests standard constant relative risk aversion preferences (when
α = 1) and the preferences considered by Abel (1999) and Chan and Kogan (2002) (when
α = 0) as special cases. Allowing for external habit formation is not crucial for the qualitative
implications of the model. However, it is useful for calibration purposes, since it (a) allows
matching the low level of interest rates and the high equity premium in the data and b)
mitigates the reaction of interest rates to an acceleration of anticipated consumption growth
caused by the arrival of a new technological epoch.15 Importantly, unlike the speciﬁcation
in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the speciﬁcation (12) implies a constant relative risk
aversion. Even though a certain degree of time varying risk aversion could be introduced
into our framework16, the property of constant relative risk aversion in speciﬁcation (12) helps
us illustrate more clearly the new economic mechanisms that drive our results. Finally, we
specify the external habit level as the running maximum of past consumption in order to
obtain closed form solutions.17
The representative agent is also the sole provider of labor services. Purely for simplicity,
15To see why, let ct1 and ct2 denote the consumption of the representative agent at two dates t1 and




t1) denote the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution with respect to a change in ct2/ct1 that is accompanied by an equal change in MC
t2/MC
t1. Using
(12) to compute ̟ yields ̟ = 1
γ+(γ−1)(α−1). When α = 1, the representative agent has standard CRRA
preferences. In this case ̟ = 1
γ and we obtain the familiar result that the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is simply equal to the inverse of the risk-aversion parameter. At the opposite extreme α = 0
and ̟ = 1. Hence, when α  = 1, these preferences exhibit a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution
with respect to variations in the growth rate of an agent’s consumption that are accompanied by equal
changes to the running maximum of aggregate consumption.
16This could be done by either building time varying risk aversion in the preferences of the representative
agent as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or by assuming investor heterogeneity as in Chan and Kogan
(2002) or Gˆ arleanu and Panageas (2007).
17As most habit level speciﬁcations already proposed in the literature, it has the attractive property that it
11we assume that work is not directly useful in the production of consumption goods, but it
is useful in the production of investment goods, i.e., trees.18 To keep with the Lucas “tree”
analogy, we shall therefore refer to workers as “gardeners” who plant the new trees, and we
also assume (for parsimony) that planting new trees requires exclusively labor.
Gardeners have a disutility of eﬀort for planting new trees and need to be compensated
accordingly. Planting a tree creates a ﬁxed disutility of Uc(s)η(s) per tree planted. Hence,


















where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount factor and dl(s) ≥ 0 denotes the increments in the
number of trees that the representative consumer / gardener has planted.
This utility speciﬁcation for the representative agent captures the fact that labor services
are sunk in this model, i.e., the eﬀort of planting a tree cannot be reversed. (Furthermore,
since η(s) can be an arbitrary adapted process, there is no loss in generality from specifying
the disutility of labor (per tree planted) as Uc(cs,MC
s )η(s).) The speciﬁcation (13) implies
that ηt can be interpreted as a reservation wage, above which the supply of labor services is
perfectly elastic.19 To see this, let VW denote the derivative of the gardener’s value function
with respect to wealth. A gardener has an incentive to plant a tree if and only if
qtVW ≥ ηtUc. (14)
Imposing the envelope condition,20 we obtain VW = Uc. Using this fact inside (14) implies
is “cointegrated” with aggregate consumption in the sense that the diﬀerence between log(Ct) and log(MC
t )
is stationary.
18The idea of modeling the consumption- and the investment-goods sectors of the economy separately is
standard in endogenous-growth models. For a nice application see, e.g., Rebelo (1991), and for a ﬁnance
application see Papanikolaou (2007).
19We note in passing that our speciﬁcation of the disutility of labor is similar to the form advocated by
Greenwood et al. (1988), since it isolates any intertemporal considerations and makes the leisure-consumption
choice operate exclusively on the intratermporal margin.
20The envelope condition follows directly from the ﬁrst order equations associated with the Bellman
equation (see, e.g., Øksendal (2003), Chapter 11).
12that another tree is planted only as long as qt ≥ ηt. Since there is a continuum of gardeners,
perfect competition among them drives the price of planting a tree to21
qt = ηt. (15)





































To close the model we need to make some functional form assumptions about ηt and ζ(i).
We choose ηt with three goals in mind. The ﬁrst goal is to reproduce (within the model) the
facts documented in King et al. (1988). Speciﬁcally, in the data wages are non-stationary
and labor income is cointegrated with total output. Furthermore, the hours worked are
stationary. As King et al. (1988) have shown, cointegration of labor income and aggregate
output can only obtain in equilibrium if the marginal disutility of an additional unit of work
is proportional to (or, more generally, co-integrated with) Uc × ct. Under this assumption
income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply cancel, the hours supplied are stationary, and
labor income is co-integrated with aggregate consumption. In our framework the marginal
disutility of an additional unit of work is given by Uc(t)ηt, so that the King et al. (1988)
21Throughout we speak of a “representative” consumer-worker to expedite the presentation. Since the
production of a new tree requires an indivisible amount of labor, we are implicitly following Rogerson (1988),
who allows for labor-supply lotteries as one of the tradable contingent claims. Accordingly, even if ﬁrms
choose a worker randomly to plant a tree, trading between workers allows them to share that risk. We refer to
Rogerson (1988) for details. We note that in our setup, one can justify the concept of a representative agent
even without labor-supply lotteries, by assuming that the planting of each tree is a divisible task amongst
workers. Speciﬁcally, if a) planting a single tree takes a continuum of tasks v ∈ [0,1], b) each worker incurs
a disutility of eﬀort ηtUc per-task performed, and c) any worker can perform any set of tasks in perfect
competition, then allocating tasks equally across workers would allocate the proceeds from planting a tree
equally across the continuum of workers even in the absence of labor-supply lotteries.
13restrictions on preferences require that ηt and ct share the same common trend, namely
ANθt. The second goal is to ensure that in equilibrium ηt grows between epochs, which
seems plausible, assuming that trees of later vintages embody more complex ideas. The
third goal is to keep the disutility of planting a tree, Uc(t)ηt, independent of the number of
trees (KN,t) planted in epoch N. This goal is motivated partly by parsimony and partly by




τN (1 + F (KN,t))
ν , (18)
where η > 0, ν ≡ γ − (γ − 1)(1 − α), and N = max{n|τn ≤ t}. A ﬁnal functional-form
speciﬁcation that facilitates closed-form solutions is
ζ(i) = bp(1 + bi)
p−1 , i ∈ [0,1], (19)
where b > 0 and p ∈ [0,1] are constants that control the level and the curvature of ζ(i).
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium deﬁnition is standard. It requires that all markets clear and all actions be
optimal given prices.
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of stochastic processes  ct,Ct,Kn,t,Ht,dlt,qt 
such that
a) ct and dlt solve the optimization problem (16) subject to (17).
b) Firms determine the optimal time to plant a tree by solving the optimization problem
(5).
c) The consumption-good market clears:
ct = Ct =
  1
0
Yt(j)dj for all t ≥ 0, (20)
where Ct denotes aggregate consumption,
  1
0 Yt(j)dj is given by the right-hand side of (10),




  χn,j,tdj, (21)
14where   χn,j,t is an indicator that takes the value 1 if ﬁrm j has planted a tree in epoch n by
time t and 0 otherwise.
d) The investment-goods market clears for all n,t :
dlt = dKn,t. (22)
e) The markets for all assets clear.
If one could calculate the optimal processes Kn,t, then the optimal consumption process




The key challenge in determining an equilibrium is that the stochastic discount factor
(23) and the optimal investment process must be determined jointly.
3 Equilibrium Allocations and Technological Cycles
3.1 Investment decisions by ﬁrms




Subject to some technical assumptions, proposition 2 in the Appendix shows that there exists

















Since F(iN,j) is increasing in iN,j, ζ(iN,j) is decreasing in iN,j, and ν > 0, an implication
of equation (25) is that ﬁrms with more productive trees always plant their trees before ﬁrms
with less productive trees: the opportunity cost of waiting is larger for the former.
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Figure 1: Response of logCt to an increase in N
A second implication of policy (25) is that no ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to plant a tree when




which we shall assume throughout.
A third and economically important implication of (25) is that in equilibrium there
is comovement between the optimal investment decisions of ﬁrms. Conditional on θt
MτN
reaching the relevant investment threshold
Ξ∗
ζ(0) for the ﬁrst ﬁrm, a number of other ﬁrms
with ζ(ij,N) ≈ ζ(0) also ﬁnd it optimal to invest in close temporal proximity.23 Figure 1
gives a visual impression of this fact by plotting the impulse response function of an increase
in N (i.e., the arrival of a new epoch) on consumption.
As can be seen, in the short run consumption is unaﬀected, as all ﬁrms are waiting to
invest. Eventually, however, the ﬁrms with the most proﬁtable ﬁrms start investing, and
hence the most productive investment opportunities are depleted early on. This leaves less
attractive investment opportunities unexploited and hence a moderation in the anticipated
growth rate of the economy going forward. This delayed reaction of the economy to a major
technological shock is consistent with recent ﬁndings in the macroeconomic literature (see,





≤ 1 at the beginning of
epoch N. Hence all ﬁrms (even the most productive one) are “below” their investment thresholds.
23This is simply because ζ(i) is a continuous function of i and θt is a continuous function of time.
16e.g., Vigfusson (2004) and references therein).
3.2 Aggregate consumption and endogenous cycles
Taking logs on both sides of equation (10) gives
log(Ct) = log(θt) + log(AN) + xt, (27)
where xt is equal to
xt = log(1 + F (KN,t)). (28)
Letting
mt ≡ Mt/MτN,
aggregating across the optimal investment policies implied by (25), and using the expression
for ζ(i) in equation (19) leads to the following closed-form expression24 for KN,t:




















Since the duration between epochs is an exponentially distributed i.i.d. variable, mt and,
consequently, KN,t and xt are stationary processes. Hence, even though the increments to
the exogenous productivity shocks θt and the epoch index N are i.i.d., the model produces
endogenous investment-driven cycles, given by xt in equation (28).
Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of log consumption into its components. Letting
E(xt) denote the unconditional expectation of xt, Figure 2 shows that xt − E(xt) can be
thought of as a measure of the distance between actual output and its stochastic trend. The
ﬁgure illustrates how the arrival of a new epoch makes AN jump upwards, consistent with
equation (3). In the short run, this jump in the stochastic trend line is not reﬂected in the
level of consumption, since consumption itself does not jump. However, as time passes and
24To see why, observe that the ﬁrst time that θt/MτN crosses Ξ∗/ζ(iN,j) is also the ﬁrst time that mt
crosses Ξ∗/ζ(iN,j).
17ﬁrms start to invest, the consumption growth rate increases as the most proﬁtable ﬁrms
exploit their investment opportunities, and slowly decays thereafter. At some point, a new
epoch arrives, and this cycle repeats itself.
Figure 2 helps explain the strong negative correlation (−0.9) between shocks to trend
and shocks to the cyclical component of consumption, which has been documented in the
data by Morley et al. (2002). They interpret this negative correlation as an indication that
the economy absorbs permanent innovations with a lag. Our model supports this conclusion:
As Figure 2 shows, the arrival of a new epoch implies that the stochastic trend line in the
economy jumps up instantaneously. However, the level of consumption remains unchanged.
Since (by deﬁnition) the cycle is the diﬀerence between level and trend, this means that the
cyclical component exhibits an oﬀsetting negative jump.25
3.3 Equilibrium stochastic discount factor
Diﬀerentiating U(ct,MC
t ) with respect to ct, and recognizing that ct = Ct, equation (23)











Because ﬁrms follow threshold policies and AN and KN,t are non-decreasing, in equilibrium
we obtain Ct/MC
t = θt/Mt.26 Furthermore, the explicit expression for KN,t implies that
Ht = e







Equation (31) together with equation (29) provide an explicit expression for the stochastic
discount factor, in terms of the exogenous shocks to the model. Proposition 3 in the appendix
25Of course, as time passes, positive shocks to the trend θt make ﬁrms invest, and hence translate into
positive cyclical shocks, mitigating the negative correlation.
26Since both KN,t and AN are non-decreasing processes we obtain the inequality MC
t = maxs≤t Cs ≤
ANMt(1 + F(KN,t)). The threshold form of the optimal investment policies in equation (25) implies that
KN,s increases only when θs = Ms. Therefore, there always exist some time s∗ ≤ t such that Cs∗ =
ANθs∗(1 + F(KN,s∗)) = ANMs∗(1 + F(KN,s∗)). Combining this last observation with the upper bound
MC
t ≤ ANMt(1 + F(KN,t)) implies that MC
t = ANMt(1 + F(KN,t)), and hence Ct/MC
t = θt/Mt.
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Figure 2: Decomposition into trend log(θt)+log(An)+E(x) and cycle xt−E(x). The ﬁgure
plots consumption for a path with dBt = 0 and Kn,τn+1 > 0.
uses this explicit expression to obtain closed form expressions for individual ﬁrm prices.
4 Qualitative and Quantitative Implications
In this section we discuss the qualitative implications of the model and illustrate its quan-
titative ones. We proceed by explaining how we calibrate the model, and in subsequent
subsections discuss the cyclical properties of expected returns, the correlation patterns be-
tween excess return and consumption growth, excess-return predictability, and cross-sectional
19µ 0.012 γ 9 b 0.8
σ 0.030 ρ 0.012 p 0.6
λ 0.1 α 0.1 η 22.6
Table 1: Parameters used for the calibration
implications.
4.1 Calibration
Before presenting some of the quantitative implications of the paper, we discuss here how
we chose the model parameters for the simulations. Table 1 presents our choice of the 9
parameters for the baseline calibration exercise. There are three parameters that are related
to the distribution of the exogenous shocks (µ, σ, and λ), four parameters that pertain to
preferences (ρ, γ, α, and η), and two parameters (p and b) that control the function ζ(i),
i.e., the the degree of heterogeneity across trees that can be planted in a given epoch. We
choose µ to match the contribution of (neutral) total factor productivity to aggregate growth.
Hulten (1992) computes that number to be 1.17%, which motivates our choice of µ = 0.012.
The parameter σ controls the volatility of consumption. We set it to σ = 0.03, in order to
match the volatility of time-integrated consumption data.27 The parameters λ,p,b,and η
control the growth contribution of the quality and quantity increase in trees (capital goods),
the speed of adoption of new trees, and the time variation in consumption growth rates. We
follow Comin and Gertler (2006), who estimate the frequency of technology-driven “medium-
run” cycles and set λ = 0.1. The parameters b and η control (respectively) the contribution
of new capital vintages to aggregate growth per epoch and the time it takes until ﬁrms
start planting trees. As a result they control the total consumption growth rate and the
cyclical eﬀects of technology adoption. We choose these parameters to approximately match
a) the total consumption growth rate in the data and b) the autocorrelation properties
27As is well understood, time integration makes the volatility of time-integrated consumption data lower
than the instantaneous volatility of consumption.
20of consumption. Finally, the parameter p controls the curvature of the function ζ(i) and
hence the acceleration in consumption growth once ﬁrms start adopting new technologies.
To measure this acceleration in growth due to adoption of a new technology, we use the
diﬀerence in consumption growth rates between 1980-1994 and 1995-2000, which is about
1.1%. We choose p to approximately match such a diﬀerence in growth rates between the
initial stages of the epoch (when no ﬁrm invests) and the latter stages of the epoch (when
ﬁrms start investing). In terms of the preference parameters ρ,γ, and α we choose ρ and
α so as to a) match the low level of real interest rates in the data and b) obtain plausible
degrees of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) with respect to changes in an agent’s
consumption that are accompanied by changes in the aggregate habit level. Speciﬁcally, as
we explain in footnote 15, γ + (γ − 1)(α − 1) provides a measure of the inverse of the IES
with respect to changes in an agent’s consumption that are accompanied by changes in
the aggregate habit level. With α = 0.1, the implied IES with respect to such shocks is
about 0.55, well within the reasonable range of values estimated in the literature (see, e.g.,
Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003)). Finally, we choose γ = 9, which is suﬃcient to
match the average equity premium.
Table 2 compares the model’s performance to some unconditional moments in the data.
The overall performance of the model in terms of unconditional time-series moments is
comparable to the pure-endowment models of external habit formation, such as Abel (1990)
and Chan and Kogan (2002). We note that the model manages to reproduce unconditional
asset-pricing moments despite the presence of investment, which typically deepens the usual
asset-pricing puzzles28. The reason is the presence of habit formation (see Jermann (1998)
for a discussion), and also the fact that consumption and investment goods are produced
with diﬀerent technologies. This latter property of the model makes it impossible to mitigate
the eﬀects of bad productivity shocks on consumption by simply running down the capital
28For instance, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2006) show that it is challenging (with general Epstein-Zin-
Weil preferences) to match both the return volatility and the equity premium, if one also insists on the fact
that productivity should exhibit a strong random walk component.
21Data Model
Mean of consumption growth 0.017a 0.016
Volatility of consumption growth 0.033a 0.027
Mean of 1-year zero coupon yield 0.029a 0.010
Volatility of 1-year zero coupon yield 0.03a 0.060
Mean of Equity Premium (logarithmic returns) 0.039a 0.041
Volatility of Equity Premium 0.18a 0.176
Table 2: Unconditional moments of the model and the data (annualized rates). All data are from
the long sample (1871-2005) in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), with the exception of the volatility
of the 1-year zero coupon yield which is from Chan and Kogan (2002). The unconditional moments
for the model are computed from a Monte Carlo Simulation involving 12000 years of data, dropping
the initial 1000 to ensure that initial quantities are drawn from their stationary distribution. The
time increment dt is chosen to be 1/60. From the simulated paths we time aggregate consumption
and dividends and obtain quarterly series for consumption growth, dividend growth, returns and
interest rates, which we then convert to annualized rates.
stock (as in the standard production-based model) and hence raises the riskiness of stocks
and the equity premium.
Table 3 shows that the quarterly consumption autocorrelations implied by the model are
about as large as in the data. Consistent with the data, the autocorrelations implied by the
model are small and decay rapidly. The intuition for this ﬁnding is that only a small fraction
of the variability of consumption comes from the cyclical component xt.
4.2 Expected returns over the course of a technological epoch
Having studied the properties of aggregate consumption in the model, we now turn to a
discussion of the model implications for asset returns, which are the main focus of this
paper. In this subsection we start by explaining how the model can reproduce (qualitatively)
a pattern of high expected returns at the early stages of a technological adoption cycle,
22Quarter 1 2 3 4
Data 0.35 0.20 0.23 0.06
Model 0.32 0.07 0.03 0.02
Table 3: Quarterly consumption autocorrelations - data and model. The consumption data are per
capita real consumption expenditures on nondurables and services (1952-2008). Source: St. Louis
FED (FRED Database). Simulated data are time-integrated over a quarter.
followed by an investment-driven boom and low subsequent returns. The three subsections
that follow assess the implications of this expected return time-variation from a quantitative
perspective.
The price of a ﬁrm, given by equation (8), consists of three components: 1) the value of
assets in place, 2) the value of growth options in the current technological epoch, and 3) the
value of growth options in all subsequent technological epochs.
In analogy to an individual ﬁrm, the value of the aggregate stock market can be de-
composed into the values of assets in place, of current-epoch options, and of future-epoch
options. Such a decomposition shows that the relative weight of growth options is coun-
tercyclical at the aggregate. When the current level of consumption is below its stochastic
trend (i.e., the cycle component xt is below its unconditional mean), there are a large num-
ber of unexploited investment opportunities for ﬁrms. Accordingly, the relative weight of
growth options is high. In contrast, when consumption is above its trend level, several of the
most proﬁtable investment opportunities have been exploited, and the relative importance
of growth options is small at the aggregate.
Growth options command a higher expected return than assets in place. Intuitively, a
growth option can be viewed as a call option where the underlying is an asset in place. Since
a call option is a levered position on the underlying claim, it commands a higher expected
return than that claim29. Since the expected excess return on the market is a weighted
29This basic intuition has been emphasized by Carlson et al. (2004) and Carlson et al. (2006) in a partial
equilibrium setting.
23average30 of the excess returns of assets in place and growth options (current and future),
the counter-cyclicality of the relative importance of growth options implies the counter-
cyclicality of excess returns.
An additional implication of our analysis concerns the lead-lag relationship between in-
vestment in new trees and excess returns at the aggregate. Once the ﬁrst ﬁrm invests, several
other ﬁrms with productivity close to the most productive ﬁrm will follow in close succession.
Since this investment-driven boom signiﬁes the exercise of the most proﬁtable growth op-
tions, it coincides with a decline in the expected excess returns going forward. This negative
relation between investment and future excess returns has been documented in the empirical
literature (see, e.g., Lamont (2000)).
To summarize, our model implies a theory for the countercyclical behavior of aggregate
returns that is driven by the composition of growth options and assets in place in the ﬁrm’s
value and is linked to the investment decisions of ﬁrms. In the next subsection we examine
some empirical implications of this investment-based view of predictability.
4.3 The correlation between consumption and returns
Besides providing a theory for the countercyclicality of expected returns, the investment-
based view of return predictability helps explain two additional salient patterns in the data:
a) the correlation between excess return and consumption growth increases with the horizon
and b) excess returns lead aggregate growth.
Table 4 illustrates the ﬁrst pattern in the data. The correlation between consumption
growth and (excess) returns in the data is 1.76 times higher for 3-year intervals than for
quarterly intervals. Speciﬁcally, it increases from 0.17 to 0.3 as one moves from quarterly
to 3-year intervals. As Daniel and Marshall (1999) document, this is a manifestation of a
more general phenomenon: the correlation between consumption growth and excess returns
increases at lower frequencies. The second row of table 4 illustrates this ﬁnding. Applying a
Baxter and King (1999) ﬁlter to isolate cycles that last less than 1.5 years (high frequency
30The weights are given by the fractions of stock market value that are due to each of the three components.
24Correlations Data Model
corr. cons. growth and returns (3-year-intervals)
corr. cons. growth and returns (quarterly) 1.76 1.63
Bandpass ﬁltered returns and consumption (low frequency)
Bandpass ﬁltered returns and consumption (high frequency) 2.93 2.60
Lead-Lag Relationships
p-value (Consumption does not Granger-cause returns) 0.45 0.48
p-value (Excess returns do not Granger-cause consumption) 4×10−4 0
Table 4: Correlations between consumption growth and excess returns and lead-lag relationships.
Consumption data include the full post WWII sample on non-durables and services as provided
by the St. Louis FED, and returns are value weighted CRSP returns. The ﬁrst row reports the
ratio of excess-return and consumption correlation over 3-year intervals divided by the respective
correlation over a quarter. The second row reports the ratio of correlation between excess return
and consumption at low frequencies divided by the respective correlation at high frequencies. We
computed this ratio by using the Baxter and King (1999) ﬁlter to isolate “high frequencies” (swings
smaller than 1.5 years) and “low frequencies” (swings between 1.5 and 8 years) in both consumption
and excess returns, and computed the respective correlations. (See Daniel and Marshall (1999) for
details.) The third and fourth rows contain the results of standard Granger-causality tests (using
2 autoregressive lags and quarterly data.)
movements) and cycles that last between 1.5 and 8 years (low-frequency movements), we
ﬁnd that the low-frequency correlation (0.44) is almost 3 times as high as the high-frequency
correlation (0.15).
As Yu (2007) shows, this increasing correlation between consumption and excess re-
turns at longer horizons/lower frequencies presents a challenge for leading single-shock,
endowment-based asset pricing models that derive return predictability exclusively from
time variation in risk aversion. (See, e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999).) Such mod-
els typically produce the opposite pattern (higher correlations at shorter horizons / higher
25frequencies).31
The present model helps address this limitation by introducing two types of technological
shocks. Shocks to θt aﬀect both consumption and returns on impact. However, the arrival
of technological epochs produces diﬀerent reactions in consumption and returns in the short
run and in the long run. In the short run, the arrival of a new epoch raises expected
returns, as the new growth options raise the riskiness of the stock market. However, average
consumption growth declines in the short run, since the old growth options become obsolete
and it is not proﬁtable to plant the new vintages yet. It is only after the passage of some
time that the new technology boosts consumption growth. The interplay of these two shocks
helps explain why consumption is weakly correlated with returns in the short run, whereas
the correlation becomes stronger in the long run.
Table 4 illustrates these eﬀects, by comparing correlations in the data with the equivalent
correlations in simulated data. Similar to the data, the model is able to reproduce the
increase in correlation as one moves to longer horizons (lower frequencies).32
The model can also provide an explanation for the fact that asset returns tend to lead
aggregate growth rates, consistent with the data. This fact is illustrated in the last two
rows of table 4, which show that the data reject the hypothesis that excess returns do not
Granger-cause consumption, but do not reject the reverse (namely that consumption does
31Intuitively, the reason is that such models impose a negative correlation between excess returns and a
smooth average of past consumption. This negative correlation attenuates the correlation between consump-
tion and excess returns at low frequencies, since the moving average of past consumption acts as a low-pass
ﬁlter that isolates low-frequency movements in consumption.
32Even though not important for our analysis, we note that the model produces higher correlations between
consumption and excess returns compared to the data. For instance the quarterly correlation between
consumption and excess returns in the model is 0.55, while the high-frequency correlation is 0.33. (The
respective numbers in the data are 0.17 and 0.15.) This is driven by the fact that the only mechanism that
separates consumption and dividends inside the model is the presence of investment. Adding labor as an
additional factor of production for consumption goods and a countercyclical labor share (as in Gˆ arleanu and
Panageas (2007)) or allowing entry of new ﬁrms (as in Gˆ arleanu et al. (2009)) are simple ways to reduce
these correlations, but we do not pursue them here for parsimony.
26not Granger-cause returns). Yu (2007) and Backus et al. (2008) provide further evidence
on these lead-lag patterns, and Yu (2007) shows that this pattern presents a challenge for
some leading, single-shock, pure-endowment based models. Our model can reproduce these
patterns in the data for a simple reason: Slightly before the onset of new-technology adoption,
expected returns are high, since the aggregate amount of outstanding growth options is large.
As time passes, and θt grows, ﬁrms start planting trees and consumption growth accelerates.
Therefore, high (expected) asset returns anticipate an acceleration of consumption growth.
We conclude this subsection by noting that our analysis does not deny the importance
of other mechanisms for return time variation (such as time varying risk aversion), nor does
our model preclude their inclusion into our framework. Our analysis simply illustrates the
beneﬁts from augmenting the commonly used, single-shock, pure-endowment asset pricing
models to allow for both embodied and disembodied shocks in an investment framework.
4.4 P/D Predictability
We conclude the discussion of the time-series properties of returns by performing the usual
predictability regressions of aggregate excess returns on the aggregate log P/D ratio. Table
5 tabulates the results of these regressions, and compares them to the data. Because of
well documented small-sample issues in return-predictability regressions, we simulate one
thousand independent samples of 100-year-long paths of artiﬁcial data. We run predictability
regressions for each of these samples and report the average coeﬃcient along with a 95%
distribution band. We then compare these simulations to the equivalent point estimates in
the data.
The coeﬃcients in the simulations have the right sign, but are about one third of their
empirical counterparts. Most of the empirical point estimates, however, are within the 95%
distribution band according to the model.
It is useful to relate our results to Chan and Kogan (2002), who study an endowment
economy with preferences similar to equation (12) and show that in the absence of risk-
aversion heterogeneity, the (log) P/D ratio predicts excess returns with a positive rather
27P/D Predictive Ability
Data Model
Horizon(years) Coeﬃcient R-square Coeﬃcent R-square
1 -0.120 0.040 -0.051 0.005
(-0.363, 0.049) (0.000, 0.112)
2 -0.300 0.100 -0.105 0.013
(-0.431, 0.108) (0.000, 0.100)
3 -0.350 0.110 -0.156 0.017
(-0.500, 0.152) (0.000, 0.114)
5 -0.640 0.230 -0.208 0.022
(-0.720, 0.225) (0.000, 0.172)
7 -0.730 0.250 -0.247 0.023
(-0.894, 0.279) (0.000, 0.240)
Table 5: Results of predictive Regressions. Excess returns in the aggregate stock market between t
and t+T for T = 1,2,3,5,7 are regressed on the P/D ratio at time t. A constant is included but
not reported. The data column is from Chan and Kogan (2002). The simulations were performed by
drawing 1000 time series of a length equal to 100 years. We report the means of these simulations
next to the respective point estimates in the data. The numbers in parentheses are the 95%
conﬁdence interval of the estimates obtained in the simulations.
than a negative sign33. Indeed, in the absence of investment, our model would share the
same features as the model of Chan and Kogan (2002) with homogenous risk aversion;





Mt would raise both the P/D ratio and
excess returns. With investment, however, increases in consumption also impact the relative
importance of aggregate growth options. In particular, during the onset of a cycle this
weight increases and hence expected excess returns increase. Simultaneously, anticipations
of increased consumption growth raise interest rates and lower P/D ratios.34 Once real-
33This leads Chan and Kogan (2002) to consider a model with agents that have heterogenous risk aversion.
34As we show in footnote 15, the magnitude of the interest rate reaction depends on the value of α. That
28options start being exercised, on the other hand, the economy experiences a combination
of increased investment, higher P/D ratios (due to lower interest rates) and lower expected
excess returns. Thus, the presence of investment counteracts the eﬀect identiﬁed by Chan
and Kogan (2002), and allows the model to match the negative relationship between (log)
P/D ratios and expected excess returns.
In results that we do not report here to save space, we also ran regressions similar to
Duﬀee (2005). He ﬁnds a negative relation between conditional excess returns and the
conditional covariance of consumption and excess returns (as predicted by the stock price to
consumption ratio and other instruments) over quarterly horizons. Using the stock price to
consumption ratio as an instrument, we found similar results over quarterly horizons, even
though in our model return predictability is driven by time variation in the instantaneous
covariance between consumption growth and excess returns. The reason is that the true
conditional covariances and the true conditional returns are unobserved; hence one needs to
use imperfect and persistent instruments over a short sample to predict time variation in
returns, and conditional covariances, which can attenuate or reverse the true link between
the two quantities.
4.5 Cross-sectional implications
The expected-return patterns that we have described so far are more pronounced for the
ﬁrms that can plant the most productive trees, i.e., the ﬁrms that are likely to proﬁt most
from the new technology. Speciﬁcally, for ﬁrms whose value is comprised mostly of growth
options, the model predicts a pattern of high expected returns up to the time of investment
followed by a discontinuous drop in expected returns as growth options are converted into
assets in place. This return pattern has been derived in a partial equilibrium setting by
Carlson et al. (2004) and continues to manifest itself in our general-equilibrium framework.
footnote also shows that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is always bounded below one in our
model, so that the decline in the P/D ratio due to increased discount rates is stronger than the increase in
the P/D ratio due to anticipations of increased dividend growth.
29This observation has implications for two well-documented patterns in the cross section
of expected returns: the size premium and the value premium.
To see why the model is able to produce a size premium, it is easiest to consider a ﬁrm
j that has a higher market value of equity (size) than ﬁrm j′, so that PN,j,t > PN,j′,t. To
simplify the analysis, assume further that both of these ﬁrms have exercised their growth
option in the current epoch, so that P o
N,j,t = P o
N,j′,t = 0. Since the future growth options
are the same for both ﬁrms, the relative importance of growth options for ﬁrm j must be
smaller, and hence ﬁrm j must therefore have a lower expected return. Hence, assuming
that one could safely ignore current epoch growth options,35 a sorting of companies based
on size would produce a size premium.
The model is also consistent with the value premium. This may seem counterintuitive
at ﬁrst, since one would expect that ﬁrms with a high market-to-book ratio should have a
substantial fraction of their value tied up in growth options, and hence should be riskier. The
resolution of the puzzle is similar to Gomes et al. (2003). Speciﬁcally, trees are heterogenous
in the model, and accordingly the market-to-book ratio of a given ﬁrm reﬂects primarily the
average productivity of its existing trees.
The easiest way to see how tree heterogeneity helps account for the value premium is
to consider two ﬁrms j and j′ that have planted a tree in every single epoch, including the
current one. As a result, the two ﬁrms have identical book values and identical growth
options. However, suppose that ﬁrm j has always been “luckier” than ﬁrm j′ in terms of the
productivity of the trees it has had the opportunity to plant. Then the market value of ﬁrm
j will be higher than the market value of ﬁrm j′, because the value of its assets in place is
higher. The growth options of the two ﬁrms are identical, and hence the total value of ﬁrm j
is larger than the total value of ﬁrm j′, and ﬁrm j has a smaller fraction of its value tied up
35The presence of current epoch growth options distorts the perfect ranking of expected returns implied
by size. Intuitively, high market values may be associated with a valuable current-period growth option (in
which case expected returns should be high) instead of numerous assets in place (in which case expected
returns should be low). For the calibrations that we consider, however, we ﬁnd that current-epoch growth
options are not quantitatively important enough to aﬀect the size eﬀect.
30in growth options. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has a lower expected return than ﬁrm j′. Since the
book values of the two ﬁrms are identical, ﬁrm j has a lower book-to-market ratio than ﬁrm
j′. This is consistent with the well known fact that ﬁrms with a low book-to-market ratio
have a low expected return (the value premium).36
Even though not at the core of our analysis, we note that the model is also consistent with
additional cross-sectional properties of the data. Thus, since high-size (and high-growth)
ﬁrms typically have trees with higher productivity on average, the model is consistent with
the empirical evidence reported in Fama and French (1995) that sorting on size and value
produces predictability for a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability (earnings-to-book ratio). The model is also
consistent with the evidence that small ﬁrms tend to grow faster than large ﬁrms.37 Finally,
the model also predicts that ﬁrms with a low book-to-market ratio (high Tobin’s q) tend
to exhibit stronger investment activity (as measured by the growth in the book value of
assets). The intuition for this is simple: A high Tobin’s q (low book to market) reﬂects a)
the productivity of existing trees, but also b) the magnitude of growth options compared
to the current capital stock of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst component drives expected returns down
as we showed above, but is irrelevant for predicting the growth rate in the capital stock.
However, the second component predicts the growth in the capital stock. The interplay of
these two forces can help explain the joint presence of a value premium along with a weak
positive correlation between Tobin’s q and the investment-to-capital ratio.
Table 6 reports results on the cross sectional predictability of returns. In order to match
more accurately the cross-sectional distribution of size and book-to-market dispersion, we
introduced idiosyncratic (disembodied) tree-speciﬁc shocks. To motivate such shocks, we
note that so far we have made the assumption that technology is fully embodied in the new
36Of course, the presence of current-period growth options distorts the ranking of expected returns implied
by the above argument. As we show below, in a calibrated version of the model this distortion is not powerful
enough to substantially aﬀect the value eﬀect.
37The reason is mean reversion: In expectation all ﬁrms have the same book value of trees (after de-
trending by AτNθt) in the long run. Hence ﬁrms who are below that stationary value at a given time can be
expected to grow faster and vice versa.
31Portfolios formed on Size (Stationary Distribution)
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log(Size) – Data -2.45 -1.36 -0.82 -0.40 0.00 0.40 0.82 1.34 1.99 3.51
log(Size) – Sim. -2.04 -1.28 -0.79 -0.39 0.00 0.38 0.77 1.16 1.72 3.61
Returns(Size) – Data 13.91 11.72 11.63 11.07 10.53 10.44 9.88 9.13 8.53 7.00
Returns(Size) – Sim. 7.96 6.55 5.79 5.72 5.79 5.85 6.00 6.17 5.77 5.63
Portfolios formed on book to market (Stationary Distribution)
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
log(BM) – Data -1.47 -0.88 -0.59 -0.38 -0.20 -0.03 0.14 0.34 0.60 1.22
log(BM) – Sim. -2.94 -1.68 -0.98 -0.47 -0.04 0.32 0.66 1.03 1.52 2.50
Returns(BM) – Data 6.65 7.86 8.05 7.73 8.53 9.01 9.21 11.05 12.00 12.67
Returns(BM) – Sim. 5.71 5.77 5.77 5.87 6.04 6.28 6.19 6.15 6.30 7.17
Table 6: Portfolios sorted by size and book to market – model and data. The data are from
the website of Kenneth French. Time period: 1927-2009. Average returns per decile are based
on monthly data, which are converted to annualized rates. We subtract 3.09% from all returns
to account for the average CPI inﬂation between 1927 and 2009. The median (log) ﬁrm size is
normalized to zero.
trees. However, in reality new technological paradigms also aﬀect the internal organization
of ﬁrms, their marketing practices, and, potentially the way existing technologies are used
in the production process. Hence, the arrival of a new epoch may aﬀect the proﬁtability
of existing trees. To account for this possibility, we allowed for the presence of tree-speciﬁc
shocks Z(i,t), so that the time-t output of tree i ∈ [0,1] that is planted at time s in epoch
N is given by ANζ(i)Z(i,t)θt. The shock Z(i,t) is equal to one at the time s that the tree
is planted — i.e., Z(i,s) = 1 — thereafter stays constant within each epoch — i.e., Z(i,t) =
Z(i,τN), t ∈ [τN,τn+1) — and jumps between epochs so that Z(i,τN+1) = Z(i,τN)u(i,τN+1),
where u(i,τN+1) is i.i.d. across trees and epochs, distributed lognormally with mean 1 and
variance σ2
u(τN+1), and independent of all other shocks in the model.
32By their construction, the idiosyncratic shocks Z(i,t) do not aﬀect a ﬁrm’s optimal stop-
ping problem, the stochastic discount factor, or any other aggregate quantity. Hence, they
do not aﬀect any of the conclusions of the paper so far. They simply add more variability to
the stationary cross-sectional distribution of size and book-to-market ratios, so as to allow
matching these distributions more accurately. With this goal in mind, we choose the variance
σu(τN+1) = 2, thus approximately matching the deciles of each of the two distributions.38 Ta-
ble 6 shows that returns sorted by book-to-market and size replicate the qualitative patterns
in the data. The magnitudes, however, are smaller.
Having illustrated that our model is consistent with some well documented cross-sectional
asset-pricing puzzles, we would also like to make it clear that its parsimonious structure and
focus on one mechanism has its limitations. One such limitation is that, in calibrations,
sorting on one of the two eﬀects (size or value) drives out the other. This is linked to the
fact that within the model only one source of risk is reﬂected in the stochastic discount factor.
Therefore, as long as one of the two sorting procedures leads to a satisfactory ranking of the
conditional betas, the other sorting procedure adds little.39 Gˆ arleanu et al. (2009) propose
a model in which the stochastic discount factor rewards multiple sources of risk because of a
lack of intergenerational risk sharing and rivalry between technological innovations. Within
such a model value and size premia could potentially be obtained as independent eﬀects, but
such an extension is beyond the scope of the current paper.
38A technical condition to ensure stationarity of the cross sectional size distribution is limN→∞σ2
u(τN+1) =
0. In the simulations we enforce this condition by simply assuming that the idiosyncratic shocks have
constant variance σ2
u for M epochs after the tree is planted and zero variance thereafter. We chose σ2
u and
M as free parameters to match as closely as possible the 20 cross sectional moments of the size and the book
to market distribution. Speciﬁcally, we choose σu = 2 and M = 2.
39In this connection we also note that (unconditional) market beta cannot explain the dispersion in excess
returns, since they do not generate suﬃcient conditional-beta variation.
335 Conclusion
We proposed a model of technological change that posits, in addition to the usual small,
embodied shocks, major disembodied ones that aﬀect output only following new investment.
Whereas it takes a while for the investment in the new technologies to become viable and thus
translate into higher output, asset prices react immediately to their emergence, giving rise to
the type of lead-lag relationship between returns and consumption that has been documented
in the data. Related, the correlations between returns and consumption growth increase with
the horizon, also as in the data. During the early stages of the adoption cycle consumption
growth is low, while excess returns, driven by the relatively numerous real options, are high;
the pattern reverses once investment increases the growth rate of consumption and the ratio
between the values of assets in place and growth options. This investment-driven counter-
cyclicality of discount rates can also generate the positive predictability of excess returns by
the aggregate P/D ratio and is also consistent with such cross-sectional phenomena as the
value and size premia.
This investment-based approach to expected-return time variation is distinct from ex-
isting endowment-based approaches that build on either countercyclical risk aversion or
stochastic consumption volatility that anticipates long-run consumption growth. Besides
providing an intuitive mechanism for expected-return variability, the investment-based ap-
proach is consistent with a host of joint time-series properties of returns and consumption;
it also is parsimonious, since it assumes that all underlying shocks are i.i.d.. Finally, it helps
explain the ability of investment to predict returns both in the time series40 and the cross
section.41
Our goal in this paper was to isolate the mechanism that links adoption of new technolo-
gies and return time variation. In order to facilitate exposition, we intentionally suppressed
other channels that could also lead to return time variation within our framework. We recog-
nize, however, that combining our setup with, for instance, some degree of time-varying risk
40See, e.g., Lamont (2000) and Hsu (2009).
41See, e.g., Titman et al. (2004).
34aversion or Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences could help further strengthen the model’s ability to
explain asset-pricing data. The latter extension seems particularly promising in our frame-
work because disembodied shocks that aﬀect the economy with a lag are a natural source
of “long-run risk”, i.e., low-frequency consumption-growth predictability. Because such an
extension does not allow closed-form solutions and introduces a series of new insights and
issues, we leave it for future work.
35A Appendix
A.1 Propositions and Proofs
In this appendix we prove that there exists an appropriate constant Ξ = Ξ∗ such that if a ﬁrm
perceives the equilibrium process for KN,t to be given by (29) and the stochastic discount factor to
be given by (31) then that ﬁrm will optimally plant a tree the ﬁrst time that θt reaches the threshold
value given by equation (25). We also provide closed-form expressions for the equilibrium value of
any ﬁrm j in round N at time t.
We start by deﬁning some constants and functions that appear repeatedly in the proof. Specif-
ically, let constants γ1, and γ∗
1 be deﬁned as
γ1 ≡
  
  − σ2
2
 2
+ 2σ2 (ρ + λ) −
 
















and the constants β1 and β2 as
β1 ≡
1





1 − p + νp
− ν − γ1 < 0,
We assume that β1 > 0. Furthermore, let the functions g1 (x), and ˜ g1 (x), be given by
g1 (x) ≡ β2 + γ1 + γ + x,
˜ g1 (x) ≡
α(1 − γ)p
1 − p + νp
+ (γ − 1)(1 − α) + x,
the functions g2 (x) and ˜ g2 (x) be deﬁned as
g2 (x) ≡
(γ − 1)(1 − α) + x





˜ g2 (x) ≡
(γ − 1)(1 − α) + x
αγ − α + γ1
+
˜ g1 (x)




and g3 (x) be given by
g3 (x) ≡
λ
(ρ + λ) + σ2
2 (γ + x)(1 − γ − x) −  (1 − γ − x)
.
A useful ﬁrst result is contained in the following Lemma.































Ct is given by Ct = θtXτn (1 + bKN,t)








Deﬁne mt ≡ Mt
MτNt
, and also let
g4 (x) ≡ g3 (x)
 
(γ − 1)(1 − α) + x












˜ g4 (x) ≡ g3 (x)
 
(γ − 1)(1 − α) + x












Furthermore, let the constants α1 and m∗ de deﬁned as
α1 =
 
(γ − 1)(1 − α)















































































































































































































when mt ≥ m∗.

























































































Let ωt ≡ θt
θτn and let ξ (ωt,mt) be deﬁned as



























where the second line follows the deﬁnitions of ωt and mt and from Ct = θtXτn (1 + F(K (mt))).
To provide a closed form solution for ξ (ωt,mt) we solve the ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE)
σ2
2




t = 0 (38)

















 1−γ < ∞. (39)
By the results in Heinricher and Stockbridge (1991), a continuously diﬀerentiable function (in ωt)
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; mt ≥ m∗,
(40)
which can be veriﬁed by direct substitution into (38) and (39).

































  B (ωt,mt,δ), (42)
where





















































mt. Now, let T → ∞, and use (38) together with (39) to arrive at (37).
39The last line of equation (41) follows from the deﬁnitions of ωt and mt and from Ct = θtXτn (1 + F(K (mt))).
The expressions mτ−
n+1 and ωτ−
n+1 denote the values of mt and ωt at the end of epoch n (i.e., an
“instant” before the epoch changes).
To determine the expression for B (ωt,mt;δ), we repeat the same argument as for V (ωt,mt).
Speciﬁcally, B (ωt,mt) satisﬁes the ODE
σ2
2




t = 0 (43)















It can be veriﬁed by direct substitution that the solution to (43) and (44) is given by
B (ωt,mt;δ) =

                      












































































; mt ∈ [ Ξ
bp,m∗]


















; mt ≥ m∗.
(45)
Hence, at the beginning of epoch, ωt = 1 and mt = 1, and therefore






where the function g3 (δ) and g4 (δ) are given in the statement of the Lemma. Combining (46) with
(42), it follows that


































40for some appropriate constants δ1, ∆1, and ∆2. Using (48) inside the recursive equation (37), recall-
ing that at the beginning of the epoch ωτn = 1, mτn = 1, and using the deﬁnition of Φ(ωτn,mτn;δ)







= ξ (ωτn,mτn) + ∆1Φ(ωτn,mτn;δ1) + ∆2Φ(ωτn,mτn;0)





































Conjecture (48) is true if the coeﬃcients on the left- and the right-hand sides of (49) match.
Matching free-term coeﬃcients, i.e., setting
∆2 = β1 + ∆2g3(0) = β1 + ∆2λβ1,
gives ∆2 as in (34). The value δ1 = 1 − γ − γ∗












needs to equal zero,
0 = α1 + ∆1g4(δ1) + ∆2g4(0),












































































































































































































Plugging the expressions for ξ (ωt,mt) and Φ(ωt,mt;δ1) into equation (50) and simplifying





given in the statement of the
Lemma.
Corollary 1 The value of assets in place for ﬁrm j is given by
PA







Proof of Corollary 1. Combine the deﬁnition of χ and (6).
With this Lemma we are now in a position to discuss the solution to the ﬁrm’s optimization
problem. The option to plant a tree in epoch N does not aﬀect the option to plant a tree in any
subsequent epoch.
The individual ﬁrm takes the processes for new trees (KN,t) and consumption (Ct), and hence
the stochastic discount factor Ht and the costs of planting a tree (equation (18)), as given. For
42the remainder of the proof we consider a ﬁrm that expects KN,t to behave as in (32). Such a ﬁrm
solves the problem












 (γ−1)(1−α)  
(51)































































To solve the optimization problem inside the square brackets we proceed in two steps. First,
we derive the optimal policy in a heuristic way by constraining attention to the class of “trigger
strategies.” Such strategies assume that the ﬁrm invests the ﬁrst time that θt (and hence Mt)
crosses an (optimally determined) threshold ¯ θ. Formally, the stopping times associated with these
strategies are given by
τ¯ θ = inf{s ≥ t : θs ≥ ¯ θ}. (54)





.43 We let Θ denote
the class of such trigger strategies. We do not attempt to justify ex-ante why the optimal strategy
should lie in this class. Instead, in a second step, we verify the optimality of these strategies via a
standard veriﬁcation theorem for optimal stopping (Proposition 2).













43To start, let ˜ V (θt,Mt) denote the value function for τ¯ θ ∈ Θ:
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equation (55) can be re-written as




















By the assumption τ¯ θ ∈ Θ, Ξ
bp ≤ mτ¯ θ ≤ m∗ and hence Lemma 1 implies that
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ζ(iN,j)[(1 + β2 − g1 (0))∆2 + (1 + β2 − g1 (1 − γ − γ∗
1))∆1]
. (57)
























∆2 (1 + β2 − g1 (0)) + ∆1 (1 + β2 − g1 (1 − γ − γ∗
1))
. (59)
44Notice that ∆1 is a function of Ξ, although other parameters are independent of Ξ. Hence, equation
(59) is a non-linear equation in Ξ. We shall denote the solution to this equation as Ξ∗ and assume
that parameters are such44 that Ξ∗ ≥ bp.
Now note that if all other ﬁrms follow trigger strategies of the form (57) with Ξ = Ξ∗, then the
resulting process for Kt is given by (32) with Ξ = Ξ∗, conﬁrming the conjecture of ﬁrm j about the
behaviour of KN,t. Assuming that the optimal stopping policy of any ﬁrm j lies in the interior of
the “trigger” class Θ, ﬁrm j behaves optimally by following policy (58) evaluated at Ξ = Ξ∗.
The next proposition shows that, if all ﬁrms j′  = j follow policies of the form (58) with Ξ = Ξ∗,
then the optimal stopping strategy for ﬁrm j (across all possible stopping strategies) indeed takes
the form (58). We use the notation x ∧ y for min(x,y) and x ∨ y for max(x,y).
Proposition 2 Assume φ ≡ ρ + λ +  γ − (γ + 1)γ σ2
2 > 0 and γ + γ1 > 1. Let Ξ∗ denote the
solution to (59), K (mt) be given by (32) with Ξ = Ξ∗, and G(θt,Mt) by (52). Deﬁne ¯ θ (Mt) as
the solution to the equation








 ¯ θ,Mt ∨ ¯ θ
 
− ηMτN ¯ θ−νX−ν
τN





Then it is optimal for ﬁrm j in epoch N to plant a tree the ﬁrst time that θt ≥ ¯ θ(Mt).
Proof of Proposition 2. The marginal ﬁrm solves the optimal stopping problem speciﬁed
by (51). For any C1 function f : R → R that is twice-diﬀerentiable a.e. deﬁne the inﬁnitesimal
operator A(f) ≡ σ2
2 θ2fθθ +  θfθ − (ρ + λ)f. Next, note that Lemma 1 implies that the function
G(θt,Mt) can be written as





















where Const depends on mt but is independent of θt. Since A(θ
γ1
t ) = 0, it is straightforward to
check that

















44This can be achieved by assuming a large enough value for η.
45Furthermore, by the construction of G(θt,Mt) (see Lemma 1) we also obtain
GM (Mt,Mt) = 0. (63)
With these observations, let ¯ θ (Mt) be deﬁned as in equation (60) and deﬁne the “candidate” value








 ¯ θ,Mt ∨ ¯ θ
 
− ηMτN ¯ θ−νX−ν
τN





whenever θt ≤ ¯ θ(Mt) and








whenever θt > ¯ θ(Mt). In what follows we show the following four properties of the function
V (θt,Mt):








V (θt,Mt) is continuously diﬀerentiable in θt, (67)
VM (θt,Mt) ≤ 0 for θt = Mt, (68)
AV (θt,Mt) ≤ 0 . (69)









































 ¯ θ,Mt ∨ ¯ θ
 
− ηMτN ¯ θ−νX−ν
τN




































Turning next to the case where θt > ¯ θ (Mt), direct diﬀerentiation of (65) shows that the partial




















To establish (67), we need to show that the “left” hand side derivative (equation [71]) and the
“right” hand side derivative (equation [72]) coincide. Note that this statement is meaningful only
when ¯ θ(Mt) ≤ Mt, for otherwise θt ≤ Mt < ¯ θ(Mt). Then the necessary condition for optimality











































, we obtain that the right hand side of equation (71)
and the right hand side of equation (72) are identical, so that
∂V (θt,Mt)
∂θ is continuous at θt = θ(Mt).
To establish (68), consider two cases. When Mt ≥ θ (Mt), then whenever θt = Mt, equation
(65) along with (63) leads to









= −η(γ − 1)(1 − α)M−ν−1
t MτN ≤ 0.














which is independent of Mt. Hence, VM (Mt,Mt) = 0.
47To show property (69), we start by noting that when θt < ¯ θ(Mt), V (θt,Mt) is given by (64).


























Hence, we only need to show that the term inside square brackets in (74) is non-positive for
θt ≥ ¯ θ(Mt). This amounts to showing that
φηMτN [(1 + F (Kt))]
ν
ζ(iN,j)












Since the right hand side of (75) is increasing in θt, and θt ≥ ¯ θ(Mt) it suﬃces to show that













































































Combining equations (77) and (78) and simplifying yields
¯ θ(Mt) =















Hence, to show equation (76), we only need to verify that





























48To this end, we only need to show
γ1 + γ
1 − λβ1
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1 − λβ1












  − σ2
2
 2
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γ1 + γ2 =
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(γ1 + γ)(γ + γ2) > 0, (80)
which implies that γ + γ2 < 0 (recall that by assumption φ > 0). Direct algebra gives
β1φ =
γ + γ2
γ + γ2 − 1
×
γ + γ1
γ + γ1 − 1
≤
γ1 + γ






γ + γ1 − 1
1 − λβ1
. (81)
Therefore, to show inequality (79), equation (81) implies that we only need to show














which is equivalent to showing that λ(γ1 + γ) ≥ φ(γ1 − γ∗
1). Direct algebra shows that
2λ
σ2 = (γ∗
1 − γ2)(γ1 − γ∗
1). (82)
By (80) and (82),














1 − γ2) ≥ −(γ + γ2), (84)
since γ∗
1 + γ ≥ 0. Given that γ1 > γ∗
1 and γ + γ2 < 0, (84) and (83) yield the desired conclusion,
namely λ(γ1 + γ) ≥ φ(γ1 − γ∗
1). This completes the proof of (69).
The rest of the proof follows steps similar to Øksendal (2003), Chapter 9. For completeness we
give a brief sketch omitting technical details. Take any stopping time τ and apply Ito’s Lemma to
e−(ρ+λ)tV (θt,Mt) to obtain
Ee−(ρ+λ)(τ−t)V (θτ,Mτ) − V (θt,Mt) = Et
  τ
0





Re-arranging (85) and using (66)-(69) yields
V (θt,Mt) ≥ Ee−(ρ+λ)(τ−t)V (θτ,Mτ)
≥ Ee−(ρ+λ)(τ−t)
 








Since τ is arbitrary, V (θt,Mt) provides an upper bound to the value function for all feasible policies.
Furthermore, this bound is attainable if the ﬁrm plants a tree the ﬁrst time that θt = ¯ θ (Mt). Hence
V (θt,Mt) is the value function for ﬁrm j in round N and planting a tree once θt = ¯ θ (Mt) is optimal.
Proposition 2 shows that if ﬁrms perceive the equilibrium stochastic discount factor to be
given by (31), then it is optimal for them to plant a tree according to equation (25). Furthermore,
Corollary 1 gives the equilibrium value of assets in place for ﬁrm j in round N at time t. To complete
the determination of the value of a ﬁrm, the following proposition provides the equilibrium value
of “current epoch” growth options and “future epoch” growth options.
Proposition 3 Let K(mt) be given by (32) with Ξ = Ξ∗. Then, the price of ﬁrm j in technological
epoch N is given by (8) where the asset in place PA
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where the constant Cind
op (iN,j) is given by
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1+β2 + (1 + bij,N)
−(1−p+νp)(1+β2)
×(1 + b)



































˜ ∆1 = −
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˜ g4 (1 − γ − γ∗
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; mt ≥ m∗.
Proof. The proof of (86) is given in Corollary 1. The proof of (87) follows upon computing
expression (64) explicitly. The proof of equation (88) follows similar steps to that of Lemma 1 and
is omitted to save space.
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